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Salvaging Recreational Boating: Reforming an 
Antiquated Maritime Practice
STEVEN WINTERS
This note looks at the history and development of the law of maritime salvage 
from antiquity to its modern iteration and outlines how the modern recreational 
mariner is being made the victim of an outdated and imbalanced system. In doing 
so, this article looks at the evolution of maritime salvage laws and the public policies 
that support and argues that the reasons underlying those policies have either 
evaporated as society and technology have changed and that salvage law, in the 
context of recreational vessels, is grossly mismatched to the realities of modern 
boating and needs to be changed to reflect current maritime practices and protect 
recreational boaters.
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Salvaging Recreational Boating: Reforming an 
Antiquated Maritime Practice
STEVEN WINTERS *
INTRODUCTION
The phrase “maritime salvage” will often call to mind images of James 
Cameron’s exploration of the Titanic or engender fantasies about aquatic 
Indiana Jones-esque adventuring and treasure hunting. Indeed, roughly half 
of the international salvage trade is made up of wreck recovery; however,
that number has been steadily decreasing for more than a decade, and the 
contract salvage of individual private vessels has been on the rise.1 Problems 
arise when recreational sailors are forcibly brought into the archaic and 
complex world of salvage law and are pressured into salvage contracts that 
they can’t hope to understand.
The recreational boating industry has exploded in popularity in recent 
years; as of 2014 there were 15.8 million recreational vessels in use in 
America, and more than 87 million Americans participated in recreational 
sailing.2 Compare this to just over 100 years ago when there were only 
15,000 recreational vessels on American waters,3 and it’s easy to see that 
recreational sailors are taking over navigable waters in America.4 Despite 
the aquatic and economic dominance of amateur recreational vessels, 
maritime law remains a morass of arcane legal concepts through which the 
inexperienced must struggle.
                                                                                                                         
* University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. 2018.
1 International Salvage Union 2015 Statistics Demonstrate the Value of the Salvage Industry, INT’L
SALVAGE UNION (Apr. 18, 2016), http://www.marine-salvage.com/media-information/press-
releases/international-salvage-union-2015-statistics-demonstrate-the-value-of-the-salvage-industry/
[https://perma.cc/DN47-J44G]. The data is published by the International Salvage Union and gathered 
from its members. It is important to note that these values represent numbers on an international scale 
and tend to exclude smaller scale salvage operations and individual salvors.
2 2014 Recreational Boating Statistical Abstract, NAT’L MARINE MFRS. ASS’N, 2 tbl.1.1, 133 tbl.7.1
(2015), http://www.nmma.org/assets/cabinets/Cabinet449/Preview.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6NE-YJEF].
3 Joseph E. Choate, Recreational Boating: The Nation’s Family Sport, 313 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 109, 110 (1957).
4 See Matthew Chambers & Mindy Liu, Maritime Trade and Transportation by the Numbers,
HOMELAND SECURITY DIGITAL LIBR., 1 (2014), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=715479
[https://perma.cc/HS93-8WXU] (reporting that water transportation contributed $36 billion to the 
economy);  Boat Sales on the Rise Heading into Summer, NAT’L MARINE MFRS. ASS’N (May 24, 2016),
https://www.nmma.org/press/article/20566 [https://perma.cc/MW3Y-6HJV] (reporting that the 
recreational boating industry has an economic impact of more than $121.5 billion).
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Recreational vessel owners will often learn about salvage law only when 
they are served with a salvage claim, creating an opportunity for predatory 
salvors to overcharge distraught vessel owners. Pure salvage in the context 
of recreational vessels presents two major issues by which salvors can prey 
on recreational sailors and take advantage of their inexperience. The first 
issue is that the legal definition of “peril” includes situations that the layman 
would never anticipate or consider to be a danger.5 The second major issue 
that faces recreational vessel owners in the salvage context is that the 
difference between towage and salvage is simultaneously highly technical 
and nebulously defined by courts.6 This is compounded by the fact that many 
recreational vessel owners have preexisting towage contracts with terms 
providing for assistance in situations such as “soft ungrounding[s],”7 yet aid 
rendered in ungrounding a vessel from the beach is considered salvage and 
falls outside such a towage contract.8
I. WHAT IS THE LAW OF SALVAGE?
A. History and Evolution of Salvage Law
Salvage law has its origins in the ancient Roman concept of negotiorum 
gestio, a legal principle which gave “to the volunteer who preserved or 
improved the property of another a right of compensation from the owner, 
although the services were rendered without the owner’s request or even 
without his knowledge.”9 Negotiorum gestio was later codified into Roman 
law as a form of maritime salvage that looks shockingly similar to the current 
iteration.10 The concept of salvage was maintained in the Mediterranean area 
for some time and can be seen in the Marine Ordinances of Trani, a city in 
Italy circa 1063 C.E., which further provided that anyone who found goods 
“cast upon the sea” was entitled to half the value of the goods in the event 
                                                                                                                         
5 See David Liscio, Know Your Salvage Rights, SAILING MAG., Apr. 4, 2013, 
http://sailingmagazine.net/article-1332-know-your-salvage-rights.html [https://perma.cc/K87V-RZ7Y] 
(relating a situation in which a recreational boat owner was charged with a large salvage bill for 
seemingly innocuous services).
6 See Mahoney Marine Servs., v. Ellie Rose, 2002 A.M.C. 2838, 2840–42 (2002) (Cattell, Jr., Arb.) 
(describing the salvage of a distressed vessel that is legally, but not plainly, distinct from towage); 
MARTIN J. NORRIS, THE LAW OF SALVAGE §§ 16–19, at 25–31 (1958) (discussing the technical definition 
of towage and how it is legally distinct, but often not plainly distinct, from salvage).
7 Ellie Rose, 2002 A.M.C. at 2842.
8 Id. at 2842–43.
9 NORRIS, supra note 6, § 6, at 6.
10 See id. § 5, at 4 (discussing how the Roman statute served to codify the much older Rhodian law). 
In relevant part, the statute read “If a ship be surprised at sea with whirlwinds, or be shipwrecked, any 
person saving anything of the wreck, shall have one-fifth of what he saves.” Id. The statute also allowed 
for a greater reward depending on the depth from which the salvage was drawn. Id. at 5.
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that the owner came forward, and if the owner did not, they were entitled to 
the entire value of the goods.11
The concept of maritime salvage was introduced to England in the late 
12th century by Richard the First in the form of the Laws of Oleron.12 The 
Laws of Oleron contained much of the same language as the earlier 
Mediterranean laws but also greatly expanded the scope of awardable 
salvage and incorporated many of the elements of modern salvage law.13 As 
feudalism grew in England, the older view of salvage began to fade away,
and any shipwrecked property came to be seen as the property of the lord 
upon whose land the property came to lay.14
This view of salvage, commonly known as “pure salvage,” is “salvage 
that is conducted without a pre-existing agreement between the salvor and 
the owner of the property to be salved.”15 This is not, however, the only form 
of salvage; in 1890, contract salvage first appeared in the form of the Lloyd’s 
Open Form (LOF).16 The original salvage agreement involved Lloyd’s of 
London, an international insurance organization. Salvage service was 
granted on an ad hoc basis and the parties agreed that the award would be 
decided by Lloyd’s at a later date.17 Two years later, Lloyd’s published the 
first ad hoc salvage form for widespread use, and in 1908, the first 
standardized LOF was published.18 The LOF swiftly came to dominate the 
realm of the salvage award, and arbitration before the Committee at Lloyd’s 
of London displaced almost all other forms of determining a salvage 
award.19 The LOF has, however, come under criticism in America, and some 
courts will no longer enforce LOF contracts because they violate the Federal 
                                                                                                                         
11 Id. § 7, at 7. 
12 Id. § 8, at 8.
13 See id. at 8–13 (taking a dim view of the formation of contracts while a vessel was in danger and 
allowing for courts to assign a value to the salvage apart from what the contract stated, as a sort of earlier 
arbitration). The law also condemned opportunistic salvors and condemned any lord who condoned such 
practices to be “fastened to a post or stake in the midst of his own mansion house, which being fired at 
the four corners, all shall be burnt together, the walls thereof shall be demolished, the stones pulled down, 
and the place converted into a market place for the sale only of hogs and swine to all posterity.” Id. at 
10. This is a more extreme measure than this Note purports to take.
14 Id. § 11, at 15.
15 Edward V. Cattell, Jr., Recreational Vessel Salvage Arbitration: An Interim Report, 29 J. MAR.
L. & COM. 257, 258 (1998).
16 Donald R. O’May, Lloyd’s Form and the Montreal Convention, 57 TUL. L. REV. 1412, 1413
(1983).
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 See Alex L. Parks, The 1910 Brussels Convention, The United States Salvage Act of 1912, and 
Arbitration of Salvage Cases in the United States, 57 TUL. L. REV. 1457, 1486 (1983) (discussing the 
history of salvage arbitration in the United States).
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Arbitration Act.20 The development of the LOF and salvage arbitration in 
America will be more fully discussed below in Part III.
American courts have recognized salvage since their inception;21
rejecting the English system where the Crown and the local lord had a claim 
on the salvage property, the courts followed a “liberal approach to 
salvage.”22 Perhaps the first case the Supreme Court heard on the issue of 
salvage was Mason v. Blaireau,23 in which Justice Marshall upheld the 
Rhodian concept of providing a “very ample reward” to a voluntary salvor.24
Salvage law has remained very steady in American courts since its inception,
as the underlying policies and reasoning set out by Justice Clifford remained 
steadfast hallmarks of salvage claims for centuries.25 The development of 
American salvage law will be more fully discussed below in Part III.
B. Salvage Law as a Matter of Public Policy
From its beginning, the concept of maritime salvage has been rooted in 
a strong public policy of encouraging “the hardy and adventurous mariner 
to engage in . . . laborious and sometimes dangerous enterprises.”26
Furthermore, in order to ensure that any would-be salvor did not turn to 
piracy, the law allowed for a “liberal compensation” in order to 
“withdraw . . . every temptation of embezzlement and dishonesty.”27 As 
discussed above, the modern concept of salvage has its roots in an era when 
the distinction between a pirate and an honest sailor was often a matter of 
only a few degrees; as such, any incentive to aid a boat had to be large 
enough to outweigh the incentive of waiting out the survivors and taking 
what remained of the ship and its cargo. From that vantage point, the 
large-percentage awards for salvage make a great deal of sense and are not 
only justified, but serve the dual purposes of ensuring that people are helped 
and that piracy is curtailed. However, it is fair to say that in the modern era,
concerns of piracy are minimal, therefore the question of what policy 
                                                                                                                         
20 See Brier v. Northstar Marine, Inc., 1993 A.M.C. 1194, 1211 (D.N.J. 1992) (holding that the 
arbitration clause of a LOF contract was void for violating the FAA as the parties had insufficient 
connection to the extra-judicial area of enforcement).
21 The maritime law of salvage has been recognized in America for longer than America has been 
a country. See NORRIS, supra note 6, §§ 13–14, at 17–18 (discussing how admiralty matters were borne 
out in the vice-admiralty courts of the American colonies and noting that “[s]alvage cases were not rare”).
22 Andrew Anderson, Salvage and Recreational Vessels: Modern Concepts and Misconceptions, 6
U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 203, 207 (1993).
23 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 240 (1804).
24 Id. at 266.
25 See The Clarita, 90 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1874) (“Public policy encourages the hearty and industrious 
mariner to engage in these laborious and sometimes dangerous enterprises, and with a view to withdraw 
from him every temptation to dishonesty the law allows him, in case he is successful, a liberal 
compensation.”).
26 The Blackwall, 77 U.S. 1, 10 (1869).
27 Id. at 14.
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reasons still justify the existence of such liberal salvage awards, particularly 
in the recreational context, remains.
The underlying public policy reasons of maritime salvage have shifted 
from curtailing piracy towards encouraging those at sea to assist distressed 
seafarers and ensure that as few people as possible are injured.28 While the 
importance of ensuring that seafarers are safe and that every measure should 
be taken to assist people who are stranded at sea is as true today as it was in 
the time of the Law of Oleron, it cannot be overstated how much the safety 
of sailors has increased in modern times29 with advancements in GPS 
technology,30 heightened safety requirements,31 and the availability of 
publicly funded assistance, such as the Coast Guard.32 So while it is correct 
to say that modern public policy justifications for salvage law include the 
safety of seafarers, the often extreme cost to the unsuspecting and untrained 
recreational vessel owner far outweighs any potential safety benefit when 
there are any number of more effective and cost-conscious methods 
available.
If curtailing piracy is no longer a pressing issue for modern maritime 
law, and the safety of seafarers is adequately guarded by other more effective 
                                                                                                                         
28 See id. (explaining how compensation in the form of salvage functions as an inducement to action 
to save life and property at sea); The Clarita, 90 U.S. at 16 (the purpose is to “encourage[] . . . mariner[s] 
to engage in . . . laborious and . . . dangerous enterprises”).
29 See Mick Bloor, Fatalities at Sea: The Good and the Bad News, SEA (July/Aug. 2008), 
http://www.sirc.cf.ac.uk/uploads/The%20Sea/194%20jul-aug%2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/YTH6-
34VF] (noting that in 1885, one in every seventy-three seafarers would die at sea, compared to a rate of 
twelve per 100,000 in the United Kingdom between 1996 and 2005—a rate that was “less than a third of 
the . . . rate for the preceding decade and less than a quarter of the rate for the decade before that”).
30 See, e.g., ACR Electronics ResQLink+ Buoyant Personal Locator Beacon, WEST MARINE,
https://www.westmarine.com/buy/acr-electronics--resqlink-buoyant-personal-locator-beacon--
13381207 [https://perma.cc/28A7-ZWEA] (last visited Feb. 24, 2018) (serving as an example of the 
advent of cheap and lightweight personal locators that are available to recreational sailors); Alexis C. 
Madrigal, More Than 90% of Adult Americans Have Cell Phones, ATLANTIC (Jun. 6, 2013),
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/06/more-than-90-of-adult-americans-have-cell-
phones/276615/ [https://perma.cc/YDP7-2PTW] (showing that, as of 2013, 91% of adults in America 
owned a cell phone). The advent of cheap personal locators and the ubiquity of cell phones strongly 
indicate that a distressed sailor has the ability to call authorities, friends, or contracted parties for 
assistance instead of relying on the assistance of passersby, as is contemplated by salvage law.
31 See Tom Burden, Do-it-Yourself: Safety Equipment, WEST MARINE (Feb. 6, 2018),
https://www.westmarine.com/WestAdvisor/DIY-Safety-Equipment [https://perma.cc/JZ3D-YWF9] 
(listing safety requirements for recreational boats promulgated by the United States Coast Guard as well
as private safety recommendations).
32 See U.S. COAST GUARD NAVIGATION CTR., RADIO INFORMATION FOR BOATERS,
http://www.navcen.uscg.gov/?pageName=mtBoater [https://perma.cc/UC2N-VNL6] (last updated Sept. 
15, 2016) (discussing how the widespread adoption of VHF marine radios allows for constant 
communication between vessels at sea and emergency services on shore). Additionally, Digital Selective 
Calling (DSC) and the Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI) service allow for a level of 
communication equivalent to on-shore telephone usage. See U.S. COAST GUARD NAVIGATION CTR.,
DIGITAL SELECTIVE CALLING, https://www.navcen.uscg.gov/?pageName=AboutDSC
[https://perma.cc/6M73-SG4R] (detailing the uses and history of the DSC system).
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and cost efficient, measures what then are the policies justifying the 
continued existence of salvage law? One potential reason that has only 
recently been developed is that salvage awards help protect the maritime 
environment.33 Proponents argue that a ship is unlikely to be saved if it is 
more economical to leave the vessel where it is, resulting in damage to the 
surrounding marine environment.34 While this is a proper, and laudable, 
goal, it should not be justification for the continuance of the practice of 
liberal salvage awards in the context of recreational vessels. The kind of 
harm contemplated by these awards is that which comes from large 
commercial tankers filled with harmful chemicals, not average recreational 
vessels, which are almost all under twenty-six feet in length.35
II. THE MODERN LAW OF MARITIME SALVAGE
A. Development of Salvage Awards in America
1. Salvage Awards in the Courts
As noted above, American courts have recognized salvage awards since 
the inception of the American legal system.36 Salvage awards occupy a 
nearly unique legal niche and are treated both as compensation and reward. 
Because salvage awards have their origin in a public policy of encouraging 
seafarers to not just save property but restore it to its rightful owner, and as 
a corollary to reduce piracy, the amount awarded is unique in that it has 
essentially no relationship to the amount of work or time put in by the 
salvor.37 Consequently, in order to ensure that seafarers are willing to take 
the risks necessary to assist distressed ships and to ensure that the property 
is returned to the rightful owners, salvage awards need to be “liberal.”38
There are six factors a court considers in determining the amount of a 
salvage award, originally spelled out by Justice Clifford in The Blackwall.
The Second Circuit listed them in order of descending importance:
                                                                                                                         
33 Anderson, supra note 22, at 229.
34 See id. (noting that a salvor is unlikely to “expend time and money on salving a vessel with little 
hope of receiving a reward”).
35 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. COAST GUARD, 2014 RECREATIONAL BOATING 
STATISTICS 69 tbl. 37 (2014), https://www.uscgboating.org/library/accident-statistics/Recreational-
Boating-Statistics-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7FM-5KDM].
36 See supra note 21 and accompanying text (explaining how salvage awards have been recognized 
since the country’s founding).
37 Anderson, supra note 22, at 228; see also Seaman v. Tank Barge OC601, 325 F. Supp 1206, 1209 
(S.D. Ala. 1971) (awarding a salvor $7553 for towing a distressed boat twenty-five miles and, in part, 
justifying such a large reward by stating that “it is unquestioned that salvage awards are not quantum 
meruit, but are rewards for seamen who voluntarily act to rescue life and property from the perils of the 
sea”); Girard v. The M/Y Quality Time, 4 F. Supp. 3d 1352, 1356 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (awarding $16,896.05 
for four hours of salvage involving neither “unusual risks” nor the use of “special skills or equipment”).
38 Seaman, 325 F. Supp. at 1209.
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i. Degree of danger from which the property was rescued;
ii. Value of the property saved;
iii. Risk incurred in saving the property from the impending peril;
iv. Value of the property employed by the salvors in rendering the 
service, and the danger to which it was exposed;
v. Promptitude and skill displayed;
vi. Labor expended in rendering the salvage service.39
Courts have also considered the “dangers presented by the situation that 
might have foreseeably developed but or the actions of the salvors” in 
determining the salvage award.40
In the modern context, these Blackwall factors are used to demarcate 
whether or not a salvage is considered low order, medium order, or high 
order.41 Low order salvage is salvage that involves a low degree of peril, 
minimal effort or time investment, and no special expertise on the part of the 
salvor.42 Low order salvage can be the most frustrating type of salvage for a 
recreational vessel owner, because it often looks like nothing more than a 
simple towage and requires only that a salvor acts promptly and 
successfully.43 Low order salvage awards range between 1% and 10% of the 
value of the salvaged property; this can lead to salvage awards, for example, 
in excess of $7,000 for a few minutes’ worth of work,44 which perfectly 
exemplifies why salvage awards in the recreational boating context are 
inappropriate.
Medium order salvage is distinct from towing and often requires greater 
risk to the salvor, a large expenditure of time and effort, and can require 
specialized skill or equipment on the part of the salvor.45 Medium order 
salvage awards range from 11% to 19% of the value of the salvaged 
property. While it is often more palatable to the vessel owner than low order 
salvage because the danger is more readily visible, the fact that the danger 
need only be reasonably apprehended by the salvor leads to situations where 
an award of $85,000 is granted when there is a dispute over whether or not 
the vessel was in any actual danger of sinking.46
Finally, high order salvage is generally typified by the high degree of 
peril that the salvor must subject themselves to in order to perform the 
                                                                                                                         
39 The Blackwall, 77 U.S. 1, 14 (1870); see also B.V. Bureau Wijsmuller v. United States, 702 F.2d 
333, 339 (2d Cir. 1983) (applying the Blackwall factors); Ocean Servs. Towing & Salvage v. Brown, 810 
F. Supp. 1258, 1263 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (also applying Blackwall’s factors); Brown v. Johansen, 881 F.2d 
107, 109 (4th Cir. 1989) (applying Blackwall’s factors, as well).
40 Anderson, supra note 22, at 226.
41 Vickey L. Quinn, Hard Aground: A Primer on the Salvage of Recreational Vessels, 19 U.S.F.
MAR. L.J. 321, 349 (2007).
42 Id. at 350–52.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 355.
45 Quinn, supra note 41, at 355.
46 Id. at 358–59.
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salvage. ; as a consequence of that peril, high order salvage awards can be 
anywhere from 20% to 100% of the value of the salvaged property.47 High 
order salvage situations would seem, on their face, to be the exact situations 
contemplated by courts when they attempt to justify the liberal nature of 
salvage awards, and to be sure, they are the situations that the law of salvage 
initially intended to mitigate. The problem that arises, however, in the 
context of recreational boating is two-fold: first, these situations are the most 
susceptible to abuse by predatory salvors, as the vessel owner is under 
extreme duress; and second, these situations are almost always emergencies
attended to by the Coast Guard, which plays a major role in the rescue and 
salvage of such vessels.
In the years since Blackwall, both international and American courts 
have recognized other factors that can impact the value of the salvage award 
granted to the salvor. Beginning in 1980, the LOF provided that, contrary to 
the no-cure-no-pay basis, a salvor who failed in an attempt to salve a “tanker 
laden or partly laden with a cargo of oil” would be awarded expenses plus 
15% as a reward for attempting to mitigate damage to the environment.48 In 
1989, the International Convention on Salvage was held and ratified by the 
United States in 1990, further providing that any salvor could receive his 
expenses and up to 200% of that value as a reward for efforts “to prevent or 
mitigate damage to the environment.”49 While an ultimately laudable goal, 
the Convention contemplated the environmental harm of a large scale loss 
of toxic cargo at sea, not the relatively small and harmless dangers posed by 
distressed recreational vessels.50
Ultimately, the public policies pursued by the courts in granting liberal 
salvage awards have a disproportionate and harmful effect on recreational 
vessel owners. Since salvage was traditionally performed by someone who 
can be best compared to the good Samaritan of yore,51 courts were concerned 
with not only properly rewarding such passersby, but encouraging 
everybody on the sea to assist anyone they saw to be in danger. The rise of 
both recreational vessels and the professional salvor, however, has brought 
to the surface the inherent problem with applying the traditionally liberal 
view of salvage awards to the “salvage” of recreational vessels. 
                                                                                                                         
47 Id. at 359.
48 Anderson, supra note 22, at 229.
49 Id.
50 Nicholas J.J. Gaskell, The 1989 Salvage Convention and the Lloyd’s Open Form (LOF) Salvage 
Agreement 1990, 16 TUL. MAR. L.J. 1, 6 (1991).
51 To be sure, courts have, from their earliest point, recognized that professional salvors exist, but 
the underlying public policy reasons for salvage awards is contemplative of the Good Samaritan. See The 
Lamington, 86 F. 675, 684 (2d Cir. 1898) (discussing that professional salvors are entitled to the same 
liberal awards as a more traditional salvor).
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2. Salvage Awards in Arbitration
The liberal awards granted by the court system in England scared vessel 
owners and their insurers and as such, the initial purpose of arbitration in 
salvage award disputes was motivated by the protection of vessel owners 
and their insurers from what they saw as unfair and extravagant awards.52
Over time, as the LOF contract gained international acceptance and the 
arbiters at Lloyd’s became known for their knowledgeable decisions, 
arbitration became the primary means of settling disputes. This translated to 
modern salvage disputes as the number of professional salvors and 
recreational vessel owners increased, however at this point, actual arbitration 
in England rarely happened and the LOF was used more as a standard from
which to operate.53 The threat of arbitration in a foreign court and the fight 
between vessel owners, salvors, and insurers demonstrates the confused state 
of salvage awards in the recreational context, and in order to understand that, 
we must look at the development of arbitration in American jurisprudence.
In early American jurisprudence, arbitration of salvage awards 
frequently occurred alongside litigation.54 Before American courts became 
concretely established, while the states were still being consolidated and 
jurisprudence was young, there was often confusion about how and where 
disputes would be settled. In the salvage context, this often resulted in 
arbitration being the de facto and primary method of settling disputes.55 With 
the arrival of LOF contract salvage in 1890 and the establishment of LOF as 
the international gold standard for salvage dispute resolution, arbitration in 
the United States was replaced and almost completely faded away.56 Despite 
efforts by the United States to encourage domestic arbitration,57 the LOF 
remained the gold standard for dispute resolution, and the majority of 
arbitrations took place before a Committee at Lloyd’s. That changed, 
however, in 1992, with a seemingly innocuous case: Brier v. Northstar 
Marine, Inc.58
                                                                                                                         
52 See INTERNATIONAL SALVAGE UNION, THE ORIGINS OF LLOYD’S FORM, http://www.marine-
salvage.com/overview/the-origins-of-lloyds-form/ [https://perma.cc/M8UC-LS5R] (discussing the 
origins and importance of the Lloyd’s Open Form as a response to complaints surrounding the 
unreasonable and coercive acts by salvors).
53 See Anderson, supra note 22, at 222 (noting that the increase of recreational vessel owners and
the influx of new insurance carriers prompted an increased skepticism of the use of the LOF).
54 See Cattell, Jr., supra note 15, at 257.
55 See Randy W. Miller, The Case of the Brig Halcyon: A Study in Old Key West Admiralty Law,
27 J. MAR. L. & COM. 311, 316, 320 (1996) (discussing how arbitration had become common place in 
larger urban areas and how it eventually became the primary method of settling disputes in Florida).
56 See Parks, supra note 19, at 1486 (noting that in 1923, there were only fourteen reported salvage 
arbitrations in the entire United States).
57 See generally id. (discussing the rise, fall, and rise again of arbitration in the United States).
58 Brier v. Northstar Marine, 1993 A.M.C. 1194, 1211 (D.N.J. 1992).
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In Brier, a case before the United States District Court for the District 
of New Jersey, the vessel owner’s insurance company argued that the LOF 
contract was unenforceable for a number of reasons.59 The court rejected 
most of the plaintiff’s arguments, but found for the plaintiff and held that a 
LOF contract was invalid because it violated the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA).60 The court held that the FAA ordinarily prohibits a court from 
ordering arbitration outside its own district, and that where such a court may 
order arbitration in a foreign nation, one of the parties must not be an 
American citizen or the underlying dispute must have some relationship to 
the foreign nation, in this instance, England.61
The court’s ruling in Brier, in effect, sounded something of a death knell 
for the enforcement of a LOF contract as the central arbitration provision 
was found to be invalid.62 While a number of district courts have followed 
this decision, not every district has adopted the Brier court’s approach,
therefore, the LOF contract still has some life left in it, but has largely fallen 
out of favor.63
With the arbitration clause of the LOF contract now functionally 
worthless, a number of American maritime arbitration societies have 
attempted to promulgate a new standard for arbitration. The three main 
organizations that occupy the hole left by the absence of the LOF contract 
are the Society of Maritime Arbitrators (SMA), the Miami Maritime 
Arbitration Council (MMAC), and the Boat Owners Association of The 
United States (BOATUS).64 In order to get a comprehensive view of how 
arbitration impacts the amount granted for a salvage award, it is important 
to look at how each organization has attempted to fill the gap left by Lloyd’s.
The SMA was founded in 1963 and was, at the time of the Brier
decision, considered the premier maritime arbitration organization in 
America, despite the fact that it had rarely, if ever, been involved in actual 
arbitration of disputes.65 After Brier, the SMA promulgated a document that 
sought to duplicate the LOF as closely as possible for use in the U.S., which 
                                                                                                                         
59 See id. at 1195 (discussing plaintiff’s arguments that the LOF contract was invalid because it “is 
a contract of adhesion,” it was entered into under fraud and duress, and that such arbitration violated the 
Federal Arbitration Act).
60 Id. at 1211.
61 Id. at 1203.
62 Id. at 1211.
63 See Jones v. Sea Tow Servs. Freeport N.Y., 828 F. Supp. 1002, 1015–16 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)
(enforcing the arbitration clause of the LOF contract and rejecting the idea that a LOF contract violates 
the FAA when both parties are American citizens and there is no connection, other than the LOF contract, 
to England), rev’d, 30 F.3d 360 (2d Cir. 1994). But see Reinholtz v. Retriever Marine Towing & Salvage, 
1994 A.M.C. 2981, 2989 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (following Brier and holding that the arbitration clause in a 
LOF contract was unenforceable where there was otherwise no connection to England in the underlying 
dispute).
64 Cattell, Jr., supra note 15, at 260.
65 Id.
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it called MARSALV.66 The MARSALV document provides one innovation 
over the LOF that deserves mention: the so-called “Small Vessel Rules,” 
which allow for an expedited process in the context of recreational vessels.67
The MMAC was founded in 1986 and was created as an alternative to 
the LOF, but occupied much the same territory as the SMA. The MMAC’s 
LOF alternative was termed the SALCON 89 and was substantially similar 
to both the LOF and MARSALV, but differed in that it was more closely 
tied to the 1989 Salvage Convention.68 In most respects, the MMAC 
conducts arbitration in much the same manner as the SMA, except that the 
MMAC provides more security to salvors69 and the final rulings are
confidential, unlike both the SMA and BOATUS awards, which are publicly 
available.70
BOATUS occupies a unique place apart from the SMA and the MMAC 
in that it began as an association of recreational boat owners, instead of as a 
society purely for the arbitration of salvage disputes. While the BOATUS 
arbitration process is, again, substantially similar to both the SMA and 
MMAC processes, it does provide a bit more protection to the boat owner in
that arbitration costs are more limited and are split between parties, and the 
list of approved arbitrators is substantially more restrictive, generally only 
consisting of marine professionals and admiralty attorneys.71
B. Elements of Pure Salvage
The Sabine72 is the seminal Supreme Court case on the current iteration 
of salvage law in the United States. The Court defined salvage as “the 
compensation allowed to persons by whose voluntary assistance a ship at 
sea or her cargo or both have been saved in whole or in part from impending 
sea peril, or in recovering such property from actual peril or loss, as in cases 
of shipwreck, derelict, or recapture.”73 The Court went on to articulate the 
three elements required for a valid salvage claim: “1. A marine peril. 2. 
Service voluntarily rendered when not required as an existing duty or from 
                                                                                                                         
66 The document was a copy of the LOF in all but name. It allowed for four types of compensation: 
(1) no-cure-no-pay; (2) fixed amount; (3) hourly rate; and (4) another form of compensation agreed upon 
by both parties. The form also allowed compensation for minimizing environmental damage and 
provided that all disputes would be heard before a committee at the SMA. Id. at 260–261.
67 It should be noted, however, that the process is still carried out in accordance with U.S. maritime 
law regarding salvage awards and carries with it all the problems discussed in this Note.
68 Cattell, Jr., supra note 15, at 262.
69 It allowed for the salvor to demand security equal to 150% of the salvage claim. Id. at 262–63.
70 Id. at 263.
71 Id. at 264–65.
72 101 U.S. 384 (1879).
73 Id. at 384.
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a special contract. 3. Success in whole or in part, or that the service rendered 
contributed to such success.”74
1. Actual Danger
The “marine peril”75 articulated by the Supreme Court in The Sabine has 
had a tumultuous history; it is a very fact-sensitive consideration on which 
courts often take a very liberal view.76 Courts that have addressed the issue 
of marine peril have found the dispositive question to be not whether the 
peril was imminent, but rather “whether it [was] ‘reasonably to be 
apprehended.’”77 To make the definition even broader, courts have held that 
the peril contemplated by the salvor does not even need to be a peril that the 
imperiled vessel could not have solved on its own; a salvor can be awarded 
a large sum of money for “saving” a ship that did not need to be saved.78
In holding that a salvage claim is appropriate not only when there is 
actual danger to a vessel but also when such danger is “reasonab[ly]
apprehen[ded],” courts have allowed for a dangerously wide range of 
circumstances in which salvage claims can be awarded.79 Claims have been 
found where a vessel had run aground on a rocky ledge,80 was adrift with no 
power near the coast,81 was still at the dock but was near a fire,82 and where 
the vessel itself was otherwise fine, but the crew was incapacitated.83 Despite 
the very generous definition courts have afforded to the word “peril,” they 
                                                                                                                         
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 See Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 42–43 (1801) (holding that peril need not be 
“inevitably certain” but rather that the danger should be “real and imminent”). It is worth noting that the 
Sabine was in seemingly serious danger. The ship had been grounded on a hidden obstruction. “Many of 
her flooring timbers and bottom planks were broken, and . . . she had in her hold sixteen to eighteen 
inches of water . . . .” Sabine, 101 U.S. at 385. 
77 Fort Myers Shell & Dredging Co. v. Barge NBC 512, 404 F.2d 137, 139 (5th Cir. 1968); see also 
Girard v. M/V Blacksheep, 840 F.3d 1341, 1355 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that a salvor need not show 
that their salvage actions were necessary to save the ailing vessel); Evanow v. M/V Neptune, 163 F.3d 
1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that a vessel is in peril when it is exposed to “any actual or 
apprehended danger which might result in her destruction”); B.V. Bureau Wijsmuller v. United States, 
702 F.2d 333, 338 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that peril will be found where there is a “reasonable 
apprehension of injury or destruction if the services are not rendered”). For a slightly narrower view of 
what constitutes marine peril, see Faneuil Advisors Inc. v. O/S Sea Hawk, 50 F.3d 88, 93 (1st Cir. 1995) 
(holding that although the peril need not be immediate, it must be “something more than the inevitable 
deterioration that any vessel left untended would suffer”). 
78 Girard, 840 F.3d at 1354 (noting that it is a “mistaken notion that . . . salvors . . . must prove that 
their actions were necessary to eliminate [peril]” (citing Legnos v. M/V Olga Jacob, 498 F.2d 666, 671 
(5th Cir. 1974))).
79 Wijsmuller, 702 F.2d at 338.
80 Id. at 335, 342.
81 H.R.M., Inc. v. S/V Eagle Light, 1997 A.M.C. 1972, 1974 (D. Conn. 1997).
82 Murray v. The John Swan, 50 F. 447, 447–48 (S.D.N.Y. 1892).
83 Williamson v. The Alphonso, 30 F. Cas. 4, 5 (C.C.D. Mass. 1853).
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have not allowed salvage claims for every mishap that involves a vessel on 
navigable waters.84
The case law showcases that courts can construe peril broadly, liberally, 
and often times in contradiction to the plain meaning of the word. 
Furthermore, because peril is not only an essential element required for a 
salvor to bring a claim, but also one of the defining factors in determining 
how large the salvage award is going to be,85 there is often a great deal of 
confusion on the part of recreational sailors and those inexperienced in 
maritime salvage.86 This confusion will often lead to inexperienced sailors, 
whose vessels have stalled or run aground, agreeing to what they consider 
towing services, which turn out to be much more expensive salvage 
services.87
2. Voluntariness and No Prior Duty
Voluntariness has been an integral part of a salvage claim dating back 
to its first recorded appearance in Roman law.88 In the Supreme Court’s early 
jurisprudence, salvage claims take on a somewhat noble cast and are set 
distinctly apart from being a mere reward for work done. In The Blackwall,
Justice Clifford waxed poetic about the policy justifications for salvage,
stating:
Compensation as salvage is not viewed by the admiralty courts 
merely as pay, on the principle of a quantum meruit, or as a 
remuneration pro opera et labore, but as a reward given for 
perilous services, voluntarily rendered, and as an inducement 
to seamen and others to embark in such undertakings to save 
life and property.89
While the contemporary view of salvage may be less poetic, the concept that 
salvage is a reward for services offered voluntarily has persevered.
In determining whether the voluntariness element has been met, courts 
primarily look at whether the salvor had a preexisting legal obligation to 
                                                                                                                         
84 See Clifford v. M/V Islander, 751 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding that there was no peril where 
a vessel had a substantial hole in the hull but was otherwise secured and not sinking); Phelan v. Minges, 
170 F. Supp. 826, 828 (D. Mass. 1959) (holding that there was no peril where a boat had drifted out to 
sea during a storm but had come to rest in calm waters); The Viola, 52 F. 172, 173 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1892), 
aff’d, 55 F. 829 (3d Cir. 1893) (holding that there was no peril where a vessel was adrift but could have 
returned to port once weather had cleared).
85 See cases cited supra note 39 and accompanying text.
86 Liscio, supra note 5.
87 See NORRIS, supra note 6, at 25 (“A salvage service is a service voluntarily rendered to a vessel 
or other marine property in need of assistance . . . . A simple towage service is one which is rendered for 
the mere purpose of expediting . . . voyage, without reference to any circumstances of danger.”);
discussion infra Part II.D.
88 NORRIS, supra note 6, at 7.
89 The Blackwall, 77 U.S. 1, 14 (1869).
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assist the distressed vessel in “relieving property from an impending peril at 
sea.”90 Where such a preexisting contract is found for salvage services, the 
voluntariness is negated and the salvor’s award is limited to the terms of the 
contract.91 It must be noted, however, that the contract must be express and 
clearly preexisting in order to negate voluntariness; “[t]he fact that a 
shipowner requests a salvage service and that the salvors in response furnish 
it, standing alone, does not create an implied contract so as to defeat a 
salvage claim.”92 The concept that a preexisting contract will void the 
voluntariness requirement is further weakened by the fact that where a 
contractor acts beyond the terms of the contract, those actions can be 
considered voluntary and the salvor may be entitled to a salvage award.93
The noble ideal that salvage awards serve to compensate the heroic 
passersby who risk life and limb to help a distressed vessel is further 
tarnished by the fact that courts have held that the motive of the salvor is 
immaterial; any salvor without a preexisting obligation, whether they are 
working for “monetary gain, humanitarian purposes or merely error,” will 
be considered voluntary.94 There can be considerable confusion and 
contention—particularly in the recreational sailing context where people are 
less familiar with maritime law––over whether salvage services are 
voluntarily offered. Because there is such an ill-defined distinction between 
towage and salvage services, many distressed sailors have found themselves 
having to defend against an expensive salvage claim for work they believed 
to be covered by a preexisting towage contract.95 The burden on recreational 
sailors, who are likely encountering the concept of salvage for the first time 
while their boat is distressed and they are dealing with well-versed and often 
predatory salvors,96 is magnified by the fact that it is the defendant who bears 
the burden of proving that there was a preexisting contract for salvage.97
Something which they may find difficult to do, given what they thought was 
an inclusive services package will likely turn out to be for limited towage 
services.
                                                                                                                         
90 In re Petition of Sun Oil Co., 342 F. Supp. 976, 981 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff’d, 474 F.2d 1048 (2d 
Cir. 1973).
91 See Flagship Marine Servs. v. Belcher Towing Co., 966 F.2d 602, 605 (11th Cir. 1992) 
(“[N]othing short of a contract to pay a given sum for the services to be rendered, or a binding 
engagement to pay at all events . . . will operate as a bar to a meritorious claim for salvage.” (quoting 
The Camanche, 75 U.S. 448, 477 (1869))).
92 See id. (quoting Fort Myers Shell & Dredging Co. v. Barge NBC 512, 404 F.2d 137, 139 (5th 
Cir. 1968)).
93 Camanche, 75 U.S. at 477–78; Sobonis v. Steam Tanker Nat’l Def., 298 F. Supp. 631, 639 
(S.D.N.Y. 1969); Smith v. Union Oil, 274 F. Supp. 248, 250–51 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
94 Quinn, supra note 41, at 337. 
95 See supra notes 5, 72–79.
96 Liscio, supra note 5.
97 Clifford v. M/V Islander, 751 F.2d 1, 5 n.1 (1st Cir. 1984).
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A final problem with the no prior duty aspect of salvage is that many of 
the major professional salvage organizations also advertise that they offer 
free towage services with membership or they advertise towing insurance at 
a low rate.98 So, a common occurrence is for a recreational vessel owner to 
have a towage contract with a major corporation, such as BOATUS or Sea 
Tow, and to call upon them when they are in a situation that is justifiably 
believed to be within the advertised sphere of the contract, only to be stuck 
with a bill for thousands of dollars.
3. Success of Salvage
The fact that a successful salvage of some amount of either the vessel or 
the cargo is a necessary element of a salvage claim might seem to conflict 
with the driving principle behind maritime salvage: that it serves as a method 
to reward good Samaritans who risk themselves to help others. It follows 
that if the public policy giving rise to a salvage claim is that people should 
be encouraged to assist seafarers who are in trouble, then the reward should 
not depend on whether or not the salvaging was successful. The reason 
underlying the requirement for success, however, is fairly simple: the 
salvage award is based on a percentage value of the vessel and cargo saved 
by the salvor, or more commonly in modern times, a lien placed on the 
property.
In an attempt to promote the salvage of vessels perceived to have zero 
value, and thus not be subject to a claim for pure salvage, the LOF was 
revised in 1980 to provide an unsuccessful salvor with his expenses plus an 
additional 15% as a reward.99 Furthermore, the International Convention on 
Salvage, which was adopted by the United States in 1990, included a 
provision that entitled a salvor to his expenses plus up to an additional 200%
as a reward for an “unsuccessful” salvage that would “prevent or mitigate 
damage to the environment.”100 Such provisions have been adopted as 
measures to encourage environmental protection at all levels of maritime 
commerce.101
                                                                                                                         
98 See Membership, BOATUS, https://www.boatus.com/towing/ [https://perma.cc/2BTK-VUCS] 
(last visited Feb. 20, 2018) (offering unlimited freshwater towing for $72 per year and unlimited saltwater 
towing for $149 per year); Membership, SEATOW, https://www.seatow.com/membership/
[https://perma.cc/QAL5-YSCD] (last visited Feb. 20, 2018) (offering 100%, nationwide coverage for 
“towing, jump starts, fuel drops, prop disentanglements & covered ungroundings”).
99 Anderson, supra note 22, at 229.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 230 (noting that this shifts the cost of environmental protection from the public to the 
owner of the vessel and encourages salvors to pursue seemingly “worthless” jobs in order to protect the 
environment). Vessel owners are encouraged to take precautionary measures so they are not responsible 
for a costly recovery of valueless property and salvors are encouraged to salvage wrecks that are 
damaging to the environment but would not otherwise be subject to a pure salvage claim. Id.
1038 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:4
C. Contract Salvage
At its core, contract salvage is the preexisting contract discussed above 
that negates the voluntariness element of a pure salvage claim. Where there 
is a preexisting obligation, contractual or otherwise, for a person to render 
salvage services for a fixed fee regardless of success, contract salvage is 
found.102 Salvage would seemingly be separated into two clear and distinct 
categories: one where there is a preexisting agreement and the terms of the 
service and award are dictated by a contract, and another where there is no 
such agreement and the salvor is merely helping on a whim. The distinction
is not so clear-cut, however, much to the dismay of many desperate and 
distraught recreational sailors.
Contract salvage stands as one of the biggest issues for recreational 
vessels and poses the greatest risk to distraught and uninformed sailors, 
subjecting them to opportunistic and often predatory salvors. Confounding, 
infuriating, and often expensive to the inexperienced is the nearly 
inexplicable concept that “[n]ot every salvage contract results in contract 
salvage.”103 While contract salvage is traditionally demarcated by a pre-
negotiated instrument, when there is a dire situation a contract for salvage 
services can be presented by a salvor to the owner of the vessel on a 
“no-cure-no-pay” basis. Such salvage is almost exclusively based on the 
LOF and, despite the fact that there is a contract involved, is considered a 
pure salvage service.104
Such ad hoc contracts mostly serve the purposes of large commercial or 
industrial shipping; normally they are negotiated and signed prior to the start 
of the salvage, and the use of standardized contracts is prevalent to facilitate 
transactions.105 Such uniform no-cure-no-pay contracts allow for salvors to 
help in situations that require immediate action where there is no time to 
negotiate. However, recreational vessel owners have no seat at the table for 
the negotiation, will not be repeat customers, are inexperienced in the 
intricacies of maritime law, and are invariably in a situation of extreme 
distress. A distraught person is handed a form and essentially told that in 
order to receive help, he or she must sign on the dotted line.106 The most 
disturbing aspect is the fact that the salvors are often companies with whom 
the vessel owner has a preexisting towage contract, which the vessel owner 
                                                                                                                         
102 See The Elfrida, 172 U.S. 186, 196 (1898) (discussing contract salvage).
103 Anderson, supra note 22, at 219. 
104 See Geoffrey Brice, The Law of Salvage: A Time for Change? “No Cure-No Pay” No Good?,
73 TUL. L. REV. 1831, 1832-1835 (1999) (discussing that both pure salvage and contact salvage deal with 
the “no-cure-no-pay” concept and how under the no-cure-no-pay concept a salvor often enters into a 
“financially abortive service”).
105 Quinn, supra note 41, at 340.
106 See Liscio supra note 5 (discussing the power a salvor has over a recreational boater in an 
emergency situation).
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more than likely thinks is the nature of the paperwork which they are signing, 
only to have a lien for upwards of 20% of the value of their vessel placed on 
it.107
While these no-cure-no-pay contracts are nominally subject to the same 
rules as any other contract108 and courts will “closely scrutinize[]”109 efforts 
to create an agreement while the vessel is “in extremis,”110 there are few 
cases in which a court has found an agreement with a recreational vessel to 
be void because of misconduct by the salvor.111 Courts cling to definitions 
and lines drawn up hundreds, if not thousands of years ago and are loathe to 
deny a salvage claim that meets the very broad limits given to the elements.
D. Towing vs. Salvage
One of the biggest areas of confusion for inexperienced vessel owners 
and thus an area of potential exploitation by opportunistic salvors, and one 
of the most common arguments against a salvage claim, is that the services 
rendered were towage services, not salvage services.112 As discussed above, 
American jurisprudence treats salvage as a service “voluntarily rendered to 
a vessel . . . in need of assistance,” whereas towage is a service “which is 
rendered for the mere purpose of expediting her . . . voyage, without 
reference to any circumstances of danger.”113 This definition often proves 
unhelpful in practice, as a leading treatise has stated the act of rescuing a
ship at sea by towing her to a place of safety is the most basic form of 
salvage.114
The one constant separating towage from salvage is that towage is 
defined by the absence of peril, whereas salvage requires that there be some 
peril to the vessel.115 While the motivation for salvage is ostensibly the safety 
of the distressed vessel and other vessels at sea—although in practice,
contemplation of safety, or any actual danger, is often unimportant—the 
motivation for towage is “convenience not safety.”116 Despite the nebulous 
and often confused, line separating towage from salvage, the difference 
                                                                                                                         
107 Id. at 359.
108 See NORRIS, supra note 6, at 261 (describing how courts review salvage contracts).
109 The Elfrida, 172 U.S. 186, 196 (1898).
110 Quinn, supra note 41, at 339.
111 See Anderson, supra note 22, at 221 (stating that a court “will set aside the contract if it finds 
that the salvor took advantage of the situation to impose unconscionable or inequitable contract terms on 
the vessel”).
112 See Liscio, supra note 5 (comparing the costs of towing and salvage services); Anderson, supra
note 22, at 211 (discussing how insurance companies often make such arguments because they are not 
liable for towage services but are liable for salvage claims).
113 NORRIS, supra note 6, at 25.
114 GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 446 (1957) (“The 
prototypical act [of salvage] is rescuing a ship in peril at sea and towing her to a place of safety.”).
115 Anderson, supra note 22, at 212 (“The hallmark of ‘towage’ is the absence of peril.”).
116 Id.
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between the two can end up costing a vessel owner tens, if not hundreds of 
thousands of dollars.117
Because the distinction between towage and salvage is one of such 
profound importance, and yet is so poorly defined, recreational vessel 
owners, who are very often inexperienced and at the mercy of an 
experienced professional salvor, are confronted with a large salvage bill for 
services that would seem like mere towage to anyone but the most seasoned 
maritime lawyer.
III. THE RISE OF SALVAGE OF RECREATIONAL VEHICLES
The Coast Guard traditionally performed rescue and salvage of 
recreational vessels, and as such, professional salvage of recreational vessels 
was not common. That is, however, until 1983 when the Coast Guard 
announced that it would no longer provide salvage services to recreational 
vessel owners and would instead rely on private salvage companies to meet 
the needs of distressed recreational vessel owners.118 That change, combined 
with the explosion in popularity of recreational sailing, the increasing 
number of recreational vessels out at sea, the attendant increase in 
inexperienced sailors, and the increased number of insurance carriers 
entering the maritime field, resulted in the number of recreational vessels 
subject to salvage awards skyrocketing in recent years.119[
IV. WHY SALVAGE SHOULD BE REPLACED IN THE RECREATIONAL 
BOATING CONTEXT
A. Predatory
To speak bluntly, the maritime doctrine of the liberal salvage award has 
not caught up with the modern concept of recreational boating, and 
unscrupulous salvage corporations take advantage of unassuming and 
                                                                                                                         
117 Since towing services are provided on a predetermined per-hour basis, but a salvage award is 
determined by a myriad of factors, including the value of the salvaged vessel and the circumstances of 
the salvage, a court finding for salvage could mean the difference between hundreds of dollars in towage 
and hundreds of thousands of dollars in salvage. See Am. Home Assurance Co. v. L & L Marine Serv.,
688 F. Supp. 502, 509 (E.D. Mo. 1988) (noting that a bill for towing services was $6,114.80 whereas the 
award for salvage was determined to be $130,000 by arbitration); Ocean Servs. Towing & Salvage v. 
Brown, 810 F. Supp. 1258, 1264 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (granting a salvage award of $8,000 for work that, 
were it considered towing, would have been at most $625); Mahoney Marine Servs., v. Ellie Rose, 2002 
A.M.C. 2838, 2840–42 (2002) (Cattell, Jr., Arb.) (awarding a salvor $15,600 for seven minutes of work 
that would have been included with the $95 per year membership at no additional charge had “peril” not 
been found).
118 Cattell, Jr., supra note 15, at 257; see also Anderson, supra note 22, at 205 (discussing the “large 
number of small salvage companies [that] have sprung up across the country” in response to the Coast 
Guard’s decision).
119 See supra note 1.
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unknowledgeable vessel owners by exploiting the complex legal definitions 
surrounding towage, salvage, and salvage awards. The explosion of 
recreational boating in the past several decades has introduced an 
unprecedented number of vessel owners and insurance companies to the 
complicated legal world of salvage awards, and they are potential targets for 
exploitation by professional salvors. Professional salvors are benefited, and 
recreational vessel owners are done a further disservice, when the Coast 
Guard is called for assistance. This often forwards nonemergency distress 
calls to professional salvors and lends them an air of legitimacy that they can 
exploit for profit.120
It is perhaps easiest to see the predatory nature of the professional salvor 
in the context of recreational boating by performing a brief case study of a 
typical salvage award dispute. To that end, consider H.R.M., Inc. v. S/V 
Eagle Light.121 H.R.M., also known as Safe Sea, is a large commercial 
salvage company based out of Rhode Island that provides salvage and 
towing services solely to recreational vessels.122 Safe Sea received radio 
contact from the Eagle Light, a recreational vessel piloted by Dr. Murray, 
after it had run aground while operating on auxiliary power at very slow 
speeds.123 It is important to note that Dr. Murray had a preexisting towage 
contract with a similar company called Sea Tow,124 but he contacted Safe 
Sea because they were closer and could assist him more readily than Sea 
Tow could.125
Safe Sea sent a vessel, the Kropp Salvor, to assist the Eagle Light, and 
in short order it towed the Eagle Light off the strand on which it had 
grounded with minimal expenditure of time, labor, and materials.126 Once 
the vessel was ungrounded, the captain of the Kropp Salvor boarded the 
Eagle Light and presented Dr. Murray with forms for signature that stated 
services were successfully rendered. The lighting conditions were such that 
the documents were functionally illegible, and there was no discussion of 
the contents of the documents, which stated that the services were for pure 
salvage and not towage, as Dr. Murray believed.127 There was no discussion 
                                                                                                                         
120 Peterson v. Allen, No. C07-1866, 2009 WL 666781, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 10, 2009).
121 1997 A.M.C. 1972 (D. Conn. 1997).
122 Id. at 1972. For an idea of how large and sophisticated this salvage operation is, note that the 
company maintains six salvage vessels worth in excess of $400,000. Id.
123 Id. at 1974.
124 It is also noteworthy that many large maritime corporations, such as Safe Sea, Sea Tow, and 
BOAT US, provide towing services, salvage services, and insurance services. The fact that a vessel owner 
can have a towing services contract with a company, receive towing services from that same company, 
and then be forced to pay a salvage award is indicative of the problem with the current state of salvage 
awards and is a problem that is present in a large percentage of salvage award disputes.
125 Eagle Light, 1997 A.M.C. at 1974.
126 Id. at 1974.
127 Id. at 1974–75. Dr. Murray believed that he was receiving towage services at a rate of $127 per 
hour, based on prior radio messages from Safe Sea. Id.
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of the type of service or cost prior to the rendering of services, and when Dr. 
Murray offered to pay at the scene, he was refused and the salvage company 
stated that it only wanted the name of his insurance carrier.128 Ultimately, 
Safe Sea sought a salvage award of $12,100, plus 18% interest, from Dr. 
Murray’s insurance carrier for the monumental task of towing the Eagle 
Light “a few hundred feet from shore,” despite the fact that the passengers 
were not in any danger and could even have walked ashore if need be.129
This type of interaction is typical of how large commercial salvage 
operations prey on unknowing and distraught vessel owners in high-stress 
situations.130 By providing for such high salvage awards, the current state of 
the law encourages salvage companies to be predatory and take advantage 
of the inexperience of recreational vessel owners by presenting them with 
complicated and often unintelligible documents that could turn an otherwise 
basic tow into a salvage that costs upwards of 20% of the value of the 
salvaged vessel. Far from its roots of encouraging the assistance of 
distressed sailors, the current state of salvage law encourages salvors to 
delay assistance until a vessel is in more distress. Instead of encouraging 
professional mariners to help each other in times of trouble, it now 
encourages professional salvors to take advantage of inexperienced vessel 
owners. In the context of recreational vessels, liberal salvage awards 
accomplish none of the public policies that purportedly justify their 
existence. Instead, they force unsuspecting vessel owners to fund the 
misdeeds of unscrupulous salvors and now have the opposite of the 
anti-piracy effect intended by their inception.
B. Public Policy
It is a well-known rule of contract law that one who assents to a writing 
is presumed to know its contents and cannot void the contract by arguing 
that she did not read them.131 While this ostensibly holds true in the context 
                                                                                                                         
128 Id. at 1975. 
129 Id. Safe Sea was ultimately awarded $9,000 by the court. Id. at 1977.
130 See Stevenson v. October Princess Holdings, LLC, SMA No. 3982, 2007 WL 5911098, at *1–2
(N.Y. Oct. 10, 2007) (Busch, Farrell, Jr., & Carroll, Arbs.) (finding that the services rendered were towing 
and denying a requested salvage award of $237,300 where a yacht was stranded due to high tide and the 
owner initially refused assistance; after learning that the salvor was affiliated with BOAT US, with whom 
the owner had a towing agreement, the owner accepted assistance and was towed to safety, whereupon 
he signed what was believed to be a receipt for towing services); Sea Tow Servs. Cape Cod Bay v. Baer, 
SMA No. 3405, 1998 WL 35281239, at *4 (N.Y. Jan. 5, 1998) (Carroll, Arb.) (discussing a salvage in 
which the owner did not agree to a salvage and was deceived by a salvor from whom he intended to 
receive towing services); Jones v. Sea Tow Servs. Freeport NY, 30 F.3d 360, 362 (2d Cir. 1994) (detailing 
facts wherein a salvor neglected to explain arbitration provisions, and when confronted with a vessel 
owner who had trouble reading and wanted to consult an attorney, stated he “would be unable to render 
assistance without a signed contract” in an emergency situation; the salvor further implied that the 
owner’s towing insurance would cover the cost of services).
131 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 157 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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of salvage law, the stresses and pressures that are inherent to any situation 
in which salvage would be required, that is to say where there is marine peril, 
should be viewed in a light more favorable to the distressed party. As 
discussed above, the situations in which no-cure-no-pay salvage contracts 
are signed are invariably ones of high stress in which the vessel owners are 
often unable to read or comprehend the documents that are being pressed 
upon them by salvors.132 Public policy, and the protection of consumers and 
vessel owners, is best served by placing a greater amount of scrutiny on 
no-cure-no-pay contracts entered into by salvors and recreational vessel 
owners.
American courts have recognized that situations involving salvage are 
inherently dangerous, and the courts have stated that since vessel owners are 
in a heightened state of vulnerability to fraud and duress in such 
circumstances, the law of salvage “cannot . . . tolerate . . . dishonesty, 
corruption, fraud, [or] falsehood, either in the rendering [of] service, or in 
[the] proceedings to recover the salvage.”133 Despite this paternalistic 
instinct, there are very few cases in which a salvage agreement involving a 
recreational vessel has been found void due to duress, fraud, or coercion.134
The seminal cases regarding salvage law all contemplate informed and 
equally-matched commercial vessels interacting with one another, and the 
concept of duress outlined in The Elfrida.135 This precedent, still followed 
by courts today, is too narrow and does not adequately account for the 
recreational boating context.
Setting aside the notion that allowing for liberal salvage awards in the 
recreational boating context promotes behavior contrary to public policy, it 
is clear that the policy reasons that originally justified such awards are not 
applicable to recreational vessels.136 The current state of maritime navigation 
is such that a recreational vessel owner is not in as perilous a situation as 
was his commercial counterpart in the 1800s.137 The original policy reasons 
no longer hold sway, and salvage law must pivot in order to accommodate 
modern public policy concerns such as consumer protection, reducing 
transaction costs, and ensuring that businesses act scrupulously—all of 
                                                                                                                         
132 See Jones, 30 F.3d at 362 (detailing a situation in which vessel owners were pressured by a 
salvor into signing a document which they could not read, due to a lack of glasses and poor lighting, or 
comprehend; the salvor informed them they would be stranded if they did not sign); Black Gold Marine, 
Inc. v. Jackson Marine Co., 759 F.2d 466, 468 (5th Cir. 1985) (detailing a situation in which a vessel 
captain, who had never seen a salvage document before and who could not understand the language used, 
was pressured into signing through false assurances by the salvor).
133 Church v. Seventeen Hundred and Twelve Dollars, 5 F. Cas. 669, 672 (S.D. Fla. 1853).
134 Anderson, supra note 22, at 221.
135 See The Elfrida, 172 U.S. 186, 197 (1898) (setting a standard for duress that contemplated that 
the vessel had an experienced “Master” and a sophisticated and informed commercial vessel owner).
136 See supra Part II.
137 See Bloor, supra note 29.
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which are contravened in a recreational context by the current state of 
salvage law.
C. Technology and Alternatives
As discussed above in Part II, the rise of modern technology and the 
evolution of recreational boating from a solitary activity to a 
community-based activity have all but eliminated the concerns that salvage 
law addresses.138 Disregarding, for the moment, that a sailor is now orders 
of magnitude less likely to be injured while at sea,139 technological 
advancements and alternative avenues of assistance have obviated the need 
to incentivize would-be salvors with such obscene awards in the recreational 
vessel context. The ubiquity of communications devices, the pervasiveness 
of on-board GPS and maritime radio, and the increased availability of 
personal locators all mean that average seafarers are increasingly unlikely to 
find themselves in a situation that requires actual salvage as opposed to 
towage.140
While the rise of the professional salvor has been at the expense of, and
a detriment to, the recreational vessel owner, it has shown that there is an 
industry ready to provide for the needs of the distressed recreational vessel 
owner. It has also shown that the incentive intended by salvage awards is no 
longer necessary and serves only to allow predatory salvage practices. 
Furthermore, while the memberships offered by organizations like Sea Tow 
and BOATUS are often misleading and play a large role in the predatory 
practices that typify the actions of salvage companies, they could be a valid 
alternative, similar to AAA, and their popularity stands as a testament to the 
idea that such memberships are valued and are a sustainable business 
model.141
V. REPLACEMENTS FOR SALVAGE LAW
It is all well and good to recognize that the application of salvage law in 
the context of recreational vessels no longer serves the public policies that 
originally underlined the existence of a liberal salvage award and that such 
a liberal award serves only to encourage predatory practices by professional 
salvors. But such recognition is pointless without taking steps to eliminate 
                                                                                                                         
138 See supra Part II.
139 Bloor, supra note 29.
140 See supra notes 29–32 (noting improvements in maritime technology and safety). 
141 See Pete McDonald, On Board With: Capt. Joe Frohnhoefer, Founder of Sea Tow, BOATING 
MAG, Mar. 4, 2013, http://www.boatingmag.com/how-to/board-capt-joe-frohnhoefer-founder-sea-tow 
[https://perma.cc/SAZ5-Z7RT] (noting that Sea Tow had 200,000 members as of 2013); Press Release, 
BoatUS,  Boat Owners Association of The US: By the Numbers (Mar. 28, 2014), 
http://www.boatus.com/pressroom/release.asp?id=985 [https://perma.cc/2D2H-RDB3] (noting that 
BoatUS had 500,000 members as of 2013).
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salvage awards and replace them with a viable, more easily comprehended 
alternative.
The most obvious replacement for the capriciously liberal salvage 
awards currently turned out by arbitrators and judges alike is to turn all 
salvage awards, whether based on pure or contract salvage, into a purely 
quantum meruit determination and eliminate the complicated factors that 
first appeared in The Blackwall.142 Although salvage awards were originally 
intended as “a reward given for perilous services, voluntarily rendered, and 
as an inducement to seamen and others to embark in such undertakings to 
save life and property,”143 such high-minded ideals no longer hold any sway 
in the realm of professional salvage. In the context of recreational vessels, 
these justifications no longer hold true as there is little to no peril in assisting 
a distraught vessel owner with a boat that has run aground,144 a ship that has 
drifted a few miles from shore,145 or a yacht that sits in the marina taking on 
water.146 Modern day professional salvors work a job like any other and 
should be paid pro opera et labore and not based on an antiquated test 
seeking to reward a maritime good Samaritan. Therefore, it makes the most 
sense to do away with salvage awards and create a standardized salvage 
agreement that provides for a default contract that sets a price for the salvage 
based on the time and materials expended by the salvor.147
A similar alternative to the current state of salvage awards, if the legal 
fiction of a contract is untenable, would be to treat a salvor the same way the 
law treats a doctor who furnishes aid on a distressed person she may happen 
upon.148 A physician may “recover on a quantum meruit basis for the 
reasonable value of services rendered and materials furnished, in lieu of 
contract.”149 As noted supra in Part III, salvage law occupies a unique niche 
in law whereby it is a restitution that is not determined by the amount of time 
or effort expended by the salvor.150 Courts have ostensibly justified this by 
pointing to the emergency circumstances that surround a salvage operation 
and how salvage awards are intended to motivate salvors to assist in times 
of danger. The same policy reasons, however, also underlie the allowance of 
quantum meruit restitution in instances of a physician providing emergency 
                                                                                                                         
142 See The Blackwall, 77 U.S. 1, 8–10 (1869) (discussing the circumstances that determine 
compensation for salvage).
143 Id. at 14.
144 Mahoney Marine Servs., v. Ellie Rose, 2002 A.M.C. 2838, 2842 (2002) (Cattell, Jr., Arb.).
145 Phelen v. Minges, 170 F. Supp. 826, 828 (D. Mass. 1959).
146 Clifford v. M/V Islander, 751 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1984).
147 It is important that this be a default and not a mandatory price setting. The law cannot expect 
that a distressed sailor will have the time or wherewithal to negotiate a contract at the scene of their peril. 
Both parties should, however, have the ability to contract around any default rules as they would in any 
other business setting.
148 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 172 (2018).
149 Id.
150 See supra Part III.
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services to a person with whom they have no prior contractual 
relationship.151 There is no discernable reason to treat salvage specially and 
as deserving of a higher reward than the quantum meruit restitution owed a 
physician who renders life-saving assistance in an emergency; the two 
situations mirror each other very closely, except one happens at sea and the 
other generally happens on land.152
One final alternative could be to place the burden of salvage awards on 
insurance companies and require, just as is required for the operation of a 
motor vehicle, that recreational vessel owners carry insurance. This 
alternative would require the insurance companies to maintain pre-
negotiated salvage contracts within a certain area of operation, thus taking 
the burden off the uninformed vessel owner and moving it to the insurance 
and salvage companies who are well informed and better equipped to handle 
the task.153 This would, however, require a greater deal of governmental 
oversight in an area that has thus far gone mostly unregulated.154 Due to the 
increased ownership and ubiquity of recreational vessels, it makes a great 
deal of sense to treat the insurance and operation of those recreational 
vessels in a manner similar to the insurance and operation of motor vehicles.
CONCLUSION
While the concept of a liberal salvage award originated as a 
well-intentioned and well-reasoned policy to discourage piracy and 
encourage mariners to act as good Samaritans, it contemplated a maritime 
ecosystem and economy comprised solely of commercial vessels, and it fails 
to meet the requirements of a modern sea that is permeated by recreational 
vessels. Courts continue to cling to factors laid out by the Supreme Court in 
1869 and refuse to adapt salvage to meet the needs of the recreational vessel 
owner. When the difference between towage services and salvage services 
can equate to hundreds of thousands of dollars, the law no longer serves to 
encourage good Samaritans or curtail piracy—it does the opposite. While 
liberal salvage awards still have their place in the commercial maritime 
industry, where parties can negotiate on equal footing and decisions are not 
made by uninformed and distraught owners of personal vessels, they have 
no place in the recreational vessel context and serve only as a tool for 
unscrupulous and predatory salvors to prey on the distressed and unaware.
                                                                                                                         
151 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 20 cmt. a (AM. LAW. INST.
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152 There is some merit to the argument that salvage awards are unique in the realm of restitution in 
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